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Abstract: !is study investigates the relationship between the level of shareholdings and identities of 
the largest shareholders, and cash dividend policy. !e study is conducted with a sample of 180 "rms 
listed on Vietnam stock exchange markets #om 2009 to 2013. !e "xed e$ect model is employed to 
analyze the balanced panel data. !e results show that the higher the level of holdings by the largest 
shareholders, the lower the dividend payout. Moreover, companies with the State and Foreign investors 
as the largest shareholders have higher dividend payout ratio than companies with local investors and 
managers as the largest shareholders. !e study also "nds that companies tend to pay higher dividends 
when pro"ts decrease or growth opportunities increase.
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1. Introduction
Privatization has been proven to be a successful approach for remarkable developments 
in emerging countries with deep State involvement (World Bank, 1995). Privatization 
may generally lead to economic improvement because of enhanced resources alloca-
tion. However, the change in ownership structure resulting from privatization may also 
create agency problems re<ecting di=erent shareholders’ perspectives. ?ere can be 
a con<ict of interests between managers and shareholders and/or between large and 
minority shareholders regarding corporate decision (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Maury 
& Pajuste, 2003; Easterbrook, 1984; Dharwadkar, George & Brandes, 2000; Maury & 
Pajuste, 2002; Gugler & Yutoglu, 2003; Ramli, 2010; ?anatawee, 2013). 
?is paper focuses on the impact of the largest shareholder in the company on divi-
dend policy.  A high dividend payout can be a burden for companies’ boUom lines. 
However, a low dividend payout may not be desirable to shareholders since it is an 
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essential tool to protect shareholders from management misconducts. If dividends are 
not paid to shareholders, managers may channel excess fund to ineXcient investments 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Meanwhile, dividend payout may also aggravate agency con<icts 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Faccio et al. (2001) indicate that the agency con<icts between 
large and small shareholders, which result from their di=erent incentives and power, 
may lead to high dividend payouts (Ramli, 2010). In some countries, shareholding of 
the \rst largest shareholder can be far exceeding that of the second largest shareholder 
of \rms in emerging markets (Faccio et al., 2001; Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Gugler & Yug-
tolu, 2003; Harada & Nguyen, 2011; ?anatawee, 2013, 2014). ?e largest shareholder, 
with their dominant percentage of shareholding within the \rm, has more power and 
incentives compared to other shareholders to represent all shareholders and monitor 
the self-dealing managers ( Jensen et al., 1999; Maury & Pajuste, 2003; Amidu & Abor, 
2006; Al-Malkawi, 2010). Nevetheless, it has been found that the large shareholding 
held by the largest shareholders facilitates their opportunity to extract private bene\ts 
or collude with other large shareholders to expropriate corporate resources (Faccio et 
al., 2001; Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Gugler & Yutoglu, 2003). 
In Vietnam, the “Doi Moi” (Economic reform) has been carried out since 1992 
to improve economic eXciency through privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
?e inevitable outcome of privatization is the shi^ from sole state ownership to vari-
ous ownership categories in privatized SOEs. However, Vietnam is assumed to be in 
the transition towards a market-based economy and the government continues to re-
tain the decisive roles in post-privatized companies (Truong & Heaney, 2007; Le & 
Chizema, 2011; Le & Buck, 2009). In the process, Vietnam market is characterized by 
weak corporate governance. ?e shareholder protection index or the disclosure index 
are lower than the mean value, showing no remarkable improvement (Global Com-
petitiveness Index report, 2009; ?e World Bank, 2012). ?e privatized \rms’ manage-
ment, retained from State owned enterprises (SOEs) is in short of competency and 
experience to drive companies in competitive markets (Truong & Heaney, 2007).  
In this institutional context, Vietnam is a great example to raise awareness of agency 
problem a^er privatization. ?is paper therefore aUempts to investigate the in<uence of 
post- privatization ownership structure on dividend payout policy in Vietnam context. 
A sample of 180 companies privatized and listed on the two stock exchanges of Vietnam 
(i.e. Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange and Ha Noi Stock Exchange) in the period of 
2009–2013 is employed for the study. 
In addition to its examination of the relationship between the shareholdings of the 
largest shareholder and dividend policy in Vietnam, the paper distinguishes itself from 
previous studies in at least one aspect. Speci\cally, it examines the di=erential impact of 
the identity of the largest shareholders on the dividend policy of the Vietnamese listed 
companies. Results from the study can be used as reference for the privatization pro-
gress in Vietnam. Underlying problems from the impact of the largest shareholder on 
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dividend policy will be also discussed. Results will be analyzed and discussions relevant 
to emerging countries with relatively similar context will then be related.
?e next section of the paper presents the theoretical background of the study and 
hypotheses development. It is followed by section three, which introduces the meth-
odology of the study, and section four, which analyzes the data results. Section \ve dis-
cusses data results and concludes the paper.
2. !eories and hypotheses
?e impact of the largest shareholders on dividend policy will be investigated in two 
aspects: their shareholdings within the \rms and their identities. 
2.1 Shareholdings and dividend policy
?e shareholdings of the largest shareholder are assumed to have a signi\cant impact 
on corporate policies, particularly the dividend decision. However, the in<uence varies 
across countries, especially the emerging ones with weak corporate governance context.
Classical agency perspective emphasizes the con<ict of interests between managers 
and shareholders. Easterbrook (1984) proposes that dividend payout can play a moni-
toring function, reducing cash <ows available to managers who can manipulate avail-
able resources and pursue negative return investments (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011). 
Because of dispersed ownership, there is high probability for free-rider problem to oc-
cur. Monitoring of managers is more challenging in the presence of a free-rider prob-
lem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Small shareholders may choose not to supervise the 
management since they expect the others will do. In contrast, large shareholders have 
a beUer chance than minor shareholders to establish \nancial discipline on managers. 
Minimum resources of \rms will then be invested in low return projects (Easterbrook, 
1984; Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Ramli, 2010; Harada & 
Nguyen, 2011). Moreover, because of bearing higher cost for monitoring the manage-
ment than small shareholders, large shareholders have more incentives to require higher 
dividend payment to compensate for such cost (Easterbrook, 1984; Maury & Pajuste, 
2003; Ramli, 2010; Harada & Nguyen, 2011). ?e positive relationship between share-
holdings of large shareholders and dividend payout is found in both Ramli (2010) for 
Malaysia and ?anatawee (2013) for ?ailand. 
However, in a weak corporate governance context, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La 
Porta et al. (1999), Faccio et al. (2001), and Ramli (2010) argue that not the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders but the con<ict of interests between large 
and small shareholders may be dominant in these markets. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Claessens and Djankov (1999), for large shareholders, the bene\ts 
from in<uencing management to make favorable decisions for their own sakes may 
outweigh the bene\ts of representing other shareholders in the monitoring of manag-
ers. ?us, large shareholders may have the tendency to act for their own bene\ts at the 
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expense of other investors. Empirically, the negative relationship between high level of 
shareholdings and dividend payout is documented (e.g., Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Gu-
gler & Yutoglu, 2003; Harada & Nguyen, 2006; Bena & Hanousek, 2008). Practically, 
they may force managers to use free cash <ows to make investment decisions with the 
companies they own even though returns on these investments are not desirable. 
In brief, the e=ect of shareholdings of the largest shareholder on dividend payouts is 
mainly considered from both monitoring and tunneling dimensions (Dyck & Zingales, 
2004): (1) the largest shareholder may act on the interest of other shareholders and 
prevent managers from self- dealing conducts as suggested by the monitoring hypoth-
esis (Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Amidu & Abor, 2006; Al-Malkawi et al., 2010; Ramli, 
2010; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; ?anatawee, 2013, 2014), or (2) they may force 
managers to make decisions to expropriate resources of \rms for private bene\ts that 
are not shared by minority shareholders (Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Gugler & Yutoglu, 
2003; Bena & Hanousek, 2008). 
According to Nguyen (2008), in the case of Vietnam, the external monitoring sys-
tem is considered underdeveloped, and the corporate governance is generally weak 
in terms of several categories such as minority shareholder protection and disclosure 
requirement. ?e largest shareholder has superior shareholdings compared to other 
shareholders, and minority shareholders are not suXciently protected (IFC reports 
on governance of 2012, 2013). ?ese characteristics of the market tend to create the 
agency problem where large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders. Based on 
widely documented tunneling behavior of the largest shareholder in the institutional 
context of weak corporate governance, the ownership held by the largest shareholder 
is speculated to have a negative in<uence on dividend payout policy as the result of the 
low minority shareholder protection (La porta et al., 2000). ?e \rst hypothesis is ac-
cordingly established:
H1: !ere is negative relationship between percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder 
and the dividend payout ratio.
2.2 Does identity of the largest shareholders ma!er?
Owners may di=er in operating targets, motivation, risk preference, capability and con-
trol of \nancial resources as well as managerial expertise (Maury & Pajuste, 2003; Gu-
gler & Yugtolu, 2003; Ramli, 2010). ?erefore, it is speculated that di=erent identities 
of the largest shareholders will not have the same impact on dividend policy (Lace et 
al., 2013).
2.2.1 The State and dividend policy
According to Bradford (2013), privately owned companies have been limited in ac-
cessing external capital resources. ?us, they have to rely on internal sources for invest-
ment and hence apply a low dividend payout policy. Meanwhile, the state shareholder 
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can easily access  external sources. Companies with the State as a large shareholder can 
have support from government to obtain external sources such as favorable loan terms 
(Le & Chizema, 2012; Le & O’Brien, 2010). ?erefore, companies with high levels of 
state ownership tend to pay higher levels of cash dividend. In addition, according to the 
signaling hypothesis, the state, which has a tendency to play a pivotal role in strategic 
sectors which are important in economy, desires to strengthen its position, signaling 
a good image. ?erefore, companies with large state ownership may pay higher cash 
dividend to signal their positive performance (Bradford, 2013; Sulong & Nor, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2011). Chen et al. (2009) also \nd that dividend payouts increase when 
government ownership increases in China market. However, as transfer of State shares 
can only be realized  by the government’s approval, the tactic of paying high dividend 
may facilitate the state in transferring a portion of non-tradable shares to other share-
holders. ?is suggests that dividend may be manipulated to serve the purpose of the 
large shareholders, i.e. the State, instead of protecting shareholders. According to Sun et 
al. (2005), \rms with high levels of state ownership have tendency to take dispropor-
tional pro\t to compensate for the support they o=er to companies (Xu & Wang, 1999; 
Nguyen, 2008; Wang et al., 2011; and Bai et al., 2013). In general, the State shareholder 
is assumed to prefer high level of dividend payments.
2.2.2 Managerial shareholdings and dividend policy
Managers tend to pay low level of dividend and retain high level of earnings in order 
to grasp investment opportunities at their convenience (Roze=, 1982; Alli et al., 1993; 
Chay & Suh, 2009; Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). From a conventional agency perspective, 
holding a position in management, large shareholders can have more opportunities to 
beUer supervise and alleviate the management discretion ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Short et al., 2002; Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). Hence, the accountability of investment 
decisions is improved ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000; Short et 
al., 2002; Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). In this context, paying high dividend as a device 
to monitor managers and increase accountability of their actions is not considered as 
an e=ective practice (Chen & Steiner, 1999; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Al-Malkawi, 2005). 
However, aligning the interests between principals and agents in the condition of weak 
corporate governance may be a challenge because of the entrenchment problem. Spe-
ci\cally, Jensen (1983) suggests that managerial entrenchment is considered as one 
of the costliest manifestations of agency problem (White 1996; Fenn & Liang, 2001; 
Maury & Pajuste, 2002). As the amount of managerial stockholding increases to a cer-
tain level, managers start seeking for their personal utility through non-value-maximiz-
ing behaviors such as high salary, empire building and so forth (Maury & Pajuste, 2002; 
Lins, 2003; Miguel, Pindado & Torre, 2004; Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008). In general, 
companies with the managers as the largest shareholders may pursue lower levels of 
cash dividend than companies with other type of the largest shareholders.
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2.2.3 Foreign investor and dividend policy
Sulong and Nor (2008) found that foreign investors in Malaysia prefer paying low cash 
dividends. ?ey argue that foreign investors, employing beUer monitoring disciplines 
in their companies in emerging markets, do not require high cash dividend payment to 
reduce agency con<ict. Moreover, due to the costs of transferring dividends overseas 
which may be taxed in their home countries, foreign investors may prefer low dividend 
payments (Sulong & Nor, 2008; Chai, 2010; Ullah et al., 2012; Abdullah et al., 2012). 
However, in a weak corporate governance context, foreign owners, who are highly 
disadvantageous in terms of information on \rm performance and market and legal 
changes, may desire more for dividend payments. In other words, foreign investors as 
large shareholders may require a higher cash dividend payment compared with local 
investors. Cook and Jeon (2006), Baba (2009), Warrad et al. (2012) and ?anatawee 
(2013) also suggest that foreign shareholdings are associated with a higher dividend 
payout than domestic shareholdings. Overall, in the weak governance context of Vi-
etnam, it is expected that foreign largest shareholders may prefer higher payouts than 
local largest shareholders. ?e second hypothesis is accordingly established:
H2: !ere is di$erential impact of identities of the largest shareholders on dividend payout ratio. 
FIGURE 1. Conceptual framework of the study
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3. Methodology
3.1 Research design and sample size
Data were collected from 2009 to 2013 and organized into a balanced panel. ?e non-
probability sampling method is applied. ?e sample is comprised of companies listed 
on two well-recognized stock exchanges in Vietnam, which are Ho Chi Minh City Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). ?e \rms were all SOEs before 
listing, i.e. listed \rms which were not SOEs before being listed are excluded. In ad-
dition, the \nancial sector including banks, real estate, securities and insurance com-
panies is excluded from the data due to its distinguished characteristics of corporate 
structures and revenue models. Companies with insuXcient data in the study period 
are also excluded as the unbalanced panel may introduce the noise of unit heterogen-
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ity. Converting unbalanced panel data into a balanced panel data may result in a biased 
sample if the missing data is not random (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  Finally, a sample 
of 180 \rms is chosen for the research. 
3.2 Model speci"cation
Two multiple regression models are constructed to test the two hypotheses of the study 
as follows:
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ܵܪܣܴܧ ൅ ࢼ૛ܩܴܱܹ ൅ ࢼ૜ܴܱܲܨ ൅ ࢼ૝ܮܧܸ ൅ ࢼ૞ܵܫܼܧHLW

 (1)
Model (1) is constructed to examine the relationship between shareholdings of the 
largest shareholder and dividend policy. 
 (2)
Model (2) is constructed to account for the impact of di=erent types of the largest 
shareholder (the identity of the largest shareholders) including the State, managers, for-
eign investors and local investors on dividend payout policy. 
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Dependent variable
Dependent variable is Dividend payout ratio (DPR) measured as the ratio of cash divi-
dends per share divided by earning per share. DPR is considered as a more appropriate 
indicator of dividend policy than dividend yield or dividend per share since payout 
ratios and ploughed back ratios are taken into consideration (Roeze=, 1982). Moreo-
ver, cash dividend is used because it directly a=ects the equity and cash holding of a 
company. 
3.3.2 Independent variables/ Ownership structure variables
Ownership structure refers to two dimensions: 
Shareholding of the largest shareholder (SHARE) is calculated as the percentage of 
ownership of the shareholders who directly own the highest volume of shares within 
the company. 
Ownership identity dummies: Binary variables are used to capture the identity of the 
largest owner (Ramli, 2010; ?anatawee, 2013; ?anatawee, 2014). In the particular 
context of Vietnam, this study classi\es the identities of the largest shareholders into 4 
categories: (1) the State (STATE)1; (2) manager (MAN); (3) foreign investor (FOR); 
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ܵܶܣܶܧ ൅ ࢼ૛ܯܣܰ ൅ ࢼ૜ܨܱܴ ൅ ࢼ૝ܩܴܱܹ ൅ ࢼ૞ܴܱܲܨ ൅ࢼ૟ܮܧܸ ൅ ࢼૠܵܫܼܧHLW
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ܵܶܣܶܧ ൅ ࢼ૛ܯܣܰ ൅ ࢼ૜ܨܱܴ ൅ ࢼ૝ܩܴܱܹ ൅ ࢼ૞ܴܱܲܨ ൅ࢼ૟ܮܧܸ ൅ ࢼૠܵܫܼܧHLW

1 According to Decree 09/2009/ ND-CP, State shareholders are comprised of investment from the State budget, 
State General Corporations, its representatives, and the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC). 
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(4) local investor (LOC)2. Companies in which the largest shareholders are local inves-
tors are classi\ed as a base category. 
3.3.3 Control variables
Pro"tability (PROF) is measured as net income divided by total asset. According to the 
Pecking order theory, companies with low pro\tability may pay low dividends retain-
ing high levels of earning for investment since issuing debt or equity for investment is 
expensive (Litner, 1986; Jensen et al., 1986; Fama & French, 2000). 
Firm size (SIZE) is proxied by (logarithm of) total assets as in Chay and Suh (2009) 
and Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) since large \rms may depend less on internal funds for 
future investment because they have easier access to external debt with their reputa-
tions (Holder et al., 1998). 
Leverage (LEV) is de\ned as total debt to total assets. LEV is controlled to account 
for the impact of debt on dividend payouts because companies with more \nancial ob-
ligations imposed by debt \nancing practices may not have suXcient fund to pay high 
cash dividends ( Jensen, 1986). High leveraged companies are more likely to pay low 
dividends to avoid using external debts with unfavorable loan terms (Roze=, 1982; Gu-
gler & Yugtolu, 2003). 
Firm growth (GROW) is the percentage of change in a \rm’s sales. GROW should 
be controlled  since \rms with growth opportunities require more capital for invest-
ing purposes (Roze=, 1982; Al- Malkawi, 2010; Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). To avoid 
transaction costs due to external \nancing, \rms may keep high retention levels, i.e. pay 
less dividend to reduce reliance on debt (Myers & Majluf, 1984). ?us, the negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and payout is expected. 
3.4 Methodology
Firstly, in order to test the two hypotheses of the study, regression analysis is conducted 
in Pooled OLS, REM and FEM. 
Secondly, the speci\cation tests, including F-statistic test and Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test and Hausman test are used to determine appropriate models. 
?en, the Breusch-Pagan test and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
are conducted to check for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. If panel 
data has heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation problem, one common practice 
to cure the problems is to use cluster- robust standard errors. Clustering at the cross-
sectional panel level will produce not only consistent but also more eXcient estimates 
2 According to Article 2, Chapter 1, Decision 121/2008/QD- BTC, foreign investors are “individuals with 
foreign nationality who reside overseas or in Vietnam, including people of Vietnamese origin with foreign 
nationality; organizations established and operating pursuant to foreign law and their branches including 
branches operating in Vietnam; organizations established and operating pursuant to the law of Vietnam with 
100% foreign capital contribution, and their branches; investment funds established and operating pursuant 
to foreign law and investment funds established and operating pursuant to the law of Vietnam with 100% 
foreign capital contribution.” 
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of standard error (Arellano, 1987; Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2010). However, even 
robust standard errors will be biased downward if residuals are correlated across sec-
tions. In this case, Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors can be a solution to both 
cross-sectional and time dependence form of residuals. In order to choose which ap-
proach to employ for mitigating the impact of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problem, Pesaran cross- sectional dependence is performed. ?e null hypothesis is that 
errors are not correlated across entities. If the null hypothesis is rejected, Driscoll and 
Kray standard errors will be applied. Otherwise, cross-sectional cluster robust standard 
errors will be applied to chosen models. 
4. Data analysis and results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
?e descriptive analysis presented in Table 1 provides an overview of variables em-
ployed in the two models. 
?e high gap between the maximum and the minimum DPRs re<ects the wild <uc-
tuations in the dividend payment practices of the samples. ?e mean value of DPR indi-
cates that, on average, these companies use 50% of their earnings to distribute cash divi-
dends to shareholders. ?e mean value is approximate to that of companies in ?ailand 
(47%) (?anatawee, 2013), while signi\cantly higher than the values of the companies 
in China (16.81%) (?anatawee, 2014), Japan (33%) (Harada & Nguyen, 2011), Ma-
laysia (22%) (Ramli, 2010) and Canada (32.8%) (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). It is 
also notable that the maximum of the dividend payout ratio is 1.23, which means that 
there is at least a \rm that pays dividend exceeding its earning. 
Table 2a shows that the mean value of shareholdings of all largest shareholders is 
39%. ?e declining number of companies with the State as the largest shareholder over 
years re<ects the reforming e=ort of the government to reduce their shares in privat-
ized companies. However, across the panel sample, the State remains the largest share-
holder, con\rming the dominance of state ownership in the Vietnamese privatization.
Table 2b shows dividend payout ratios by companies with speci\c category of the larg-
est shareholder. From the summary, it is worth noting that the company paying dividend 
TABLE 1. Statistical summary of variables
DPR SHARE GROW PROF LEV SIZE
 Mean  0.509250  0.389679  0.133027  0.073543  0.789044  26.66475
 Maximum  1.235330  0.874600  1.018341  0.304643  4.122691  29.88731
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000800 -0.776193 -0.159015  0.000000  23.52062
 Skewness -0.236796 -0.399536  0.256241  0.952276  1.267256 -0.188859
 Kurtosis  2.481664  2.177471  4.259685  4.488913  4.430595  2.530771
 Jarque-Bera  18.48604  49.31507  69.35413  219.1569  317.6383  13.60673
 Probability 0.000097 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.001110
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in excess of its earning has the State as the largest shareholder. Moreover, companies with 
the State as the largest shareholder also have the highest average dividend payout ratio. 
We project that the companies with the State as the largest shareholder will pay higher 
dividend than other companies. ?e result will be con\rmed in the regression model.
4.2 Multicollinearity test
In Table 3, there are only two comparatively high correlations. First, there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and size as discussed in the descriptive statistics. Second-
ly, the relationship between leverage and pro\tability suggests that if companies largely 
depend on debt, there may be an improvement in the boUom line. However, overall, the 
TABLE 2A. Average dividend payout ratio, average shareholdings and identities of the largest 
shareholder of 180 companies over 5 years of the sample. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
DPR 44% 50% 54% 53% 55%
Share 38% 38% 39% 40% 40%
Manager 10 7 7 7 5
(%) 6% 4% 4% 4% 3%
State 140 135 131 130 128
(%) 78% 75% 73% 72% 71%
Local investors 25 32 34 36 40
(%) 14% 18% 19% 20% 22%
Foreign investors 5 6 8 7 7
(%) 3% 3% 4% 4% 4%
Grow 13% 23% 22% 3% 5%
Prof 9% 8% 7% 6% 5%
TABLE 2B. Dividend payout ratio by speci"c largest shareholder
DPR State Manager Local institution Foreign institution
Min 0% 0% 0% 0%
Max 124% 96% 104% 100%
Average 53% 40% 46% 41%
TABLE 3. Correlation analysis
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Probability DPR  SHARE  GROW  PROF  LEV  SIZE 
DPR  1.000000
----- 
SHARE  -0.052124 1.000000
0.1181 ----- 
GROW  -0.003808 -0.055510 1.000000
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table reveals low correlations among independent variables. ?erefore, multicollinear-
ity is not a problem in this study.
4.3 Regression analysis
4.3.1 Testing Model (1) - the relationship between shareholdings of the largest share-
holder and dividend payout ratio
As in Table 4, diagnostic tests indicate that FEM is an appropriate model. Time \xed 
e=ects are also not required in the model. ?e data has both a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem. However, there is no cross-sectional dependence of residuals, 
cluster robust standard error will produce standard errors that are robust to heteroske-
dasticity and within panel serial correlation (Arellano, 1987). ?erefore, the e=ect of 
0.9092 0.0961 ----- 
PROF  -0.111715 -0.087891 0.137644 1.000000
0.0008 0.0083 0.0000 ----- 
LEV  -0.135890 0.147791 0.079392 -0.502067 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0172 0.0000 ----- 
SIZE  -0.189457 0.064355 0.092266 -0.174631 0.429567 1.000000
0.0000 0.0536 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚݄ܵܽݎ݁ ൅ ࢼ૛ܩݎ݋ݓ ൅ ࢼ૜ܲݎ݋݂ ൅ ࢼ૝ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ࢼ૞ܮ݁ݒ ൅HLW

TABLE 3 continued 
TABLE 4. Regression results of Model (1)
 
Pooled  
OLS
REM
FEM 
(entity "xed 
e$ect)
FEM (en-
tity and time 
"xed e$ect)
FEM with 
robust SE
Share -0.04   -0.08   -0.33 * -0.35 * -0.33 ***
Grow 0.06 *** 0.07 ** 0.084 * 0.08 ** 0.084 **
Prof -1.17 * -1.46 * -1.63 * -1.48 * -1.63 *
Lev -0.064 * -0.073 * -0.99 * -0.83 * -0.099 **
Size -0.033 * -0.026 * 0.11 * 0.047   0.11 **
Year 2010             0.024      
Year 2011             0.056 **    
Yeah 2012             0.046      
Year 2013             0.05      
Const 1.54 * 1.39 * -2.11 **  -0.48   -2.11 ***
R- squared 0.0771   0.079   0.0816    0.087   0.0817  
F 16.01       12.71   7.55    10.02  
Prob. 0.000       0.000   0.000    0.000  
Wald (X2)     66.05              
Prob. X2     0              
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the identity of the largest shareholder on dividend payout ratio is analyzed by entity 
\xed e=ect with cluster robust standard errors. 
Shareholdings of the largest shareholder have been found to have a signi\cant nega-
tive relationship with dividend payout ratio at a signi\cance level of 1%. Hypothesis 
(H1) is therefore supported.
4.3.2 Testing Model (2) – the effect of identity of the largest shareholder on dividend 
payout ratio
Similar to model (1), the e=ect of the identity of the largest shareholder on divi-
dend payout ratio is also analyzed by panel \xed e=ect with cluster robust standard 
errors (Table 5). It is important to note that the coeXcients of dummy variables refer 
to di=erence in average levels of dividend payment pursued by di=erent types of the 
largest owners, holding other variables constant. Since the State and Foreign variables 
are signi\cantly di=erent from reference group with a 5% level of signi\cance, it can be 
concluded that on average, companies with the State or foreign investors as the largest 
shareholders pay higher level of payout than base companies. Meanwhile, companies 
with the manager as the largest shareholder, as speculated, pay lower average level divi-
dend than the reference group. However, the coeXcient is not signi\cant (only at 13.7% 
level of signi\cance). 
TABLE 4 continued 
Breusch-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
Ho:  Constant variance
chi2(5) = 113.51, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Woolridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel 
data
Ho: no \rst-order autocorrelation
F(1, 179)= 16.18 Prof > F= 0.0001
F test for \xed e=ect
Ho: ?ere is no heterogeneousness across companies
F(179, 711)= 2.89 Prof>f= 0.000
Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test 
for random e=ects
Test: var(u) = 0
chi2(1) = 122.37, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman test
Ho: Di=erence in  coeXcients not systematic
chi2(5) = 23.29, Prob > chi2 = 0.003
Test for time \xed e=ect
Ho: All year coeXcients are jointly equal to zero
F (4, 711) = 1.1 Prof >F= 0.3577
Pesaran CD test
Ho: Errors are not correlated across entities
Pr= 1.2046
Notes: † *p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.1 
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ܵݐܽݐ݁ ൅ ࢼ૛ܯܽ݊ܽ݃݁ݎ ൅ ࢼ૜ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊ ൅ ࢼ૝ܩܴܱܹ ൅ ࢼ૞ܴܱܲܨ ൅ࢼ૟ܮܧܸ ൅ ࢼૠܵܫܼܧ ൅HLW
'35LW ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ܵݐܽݐ݁ ൅ ࢼ૛ܯܽ݊ܽ݃݁ݎ ൅ ࢼ૜ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊ ൅ ࢼ૝ܩܴܱܹ ൅ ࢼ૞ܴܱܲܨ ൅ࢼ૟ܮܧܸ ൅ ࢼૠܵܫܼܧ ൅HLW

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5. Discussions and Conclusions
Privatization is the important part of economic restructuring programs in most tran-
sition economies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Megginson & NeUer, 2001). Generally, 
privatization is associated with the alteration in ownership structure. While changes 
in ownership structure are believed to improve companies’ pro\tability and eXciency 
(Megginson & NeUer, 2001; Truong & Heaney, 2007; Le & Buck, 2009), in Vietnam 
and other transition markets, it may induce corporate governance issues (Truong & 
TABLE 5. Regression results of Model (2)
  Pooled OLS REM
FEM 
(entity "xed 
e$ect)
FEM (en-
tity and time 
"xed e$ect)
FEM with 
robust SE
State 0.075 * 0.072 * 0.118 ** 0.12 ** 0.118 *
Manager -0.037   -0.065   -0.086   -0.077   -0.086  
Foreign -0.04   -0.036   0.058   0.04   0.058 *
Grow 0.06 ** 0.071 ** 0.082 ** 0.078 ** 0.082 **
Prof -1.16 * -1.42 * -1.569 * -1.44 * -1.569 *
Lev -0.073 * -0.08 * -0.099 * -0.084 * -0.09 **
Size -0.02 * -0.022 ** 0.121 * 0.066   0.121 *
Year 2010             0.024      
Year 2011             0.0549 **    
Yeah 2012             0.0417      
Year 2013             0.046      
Const 1.349 * 1.21 * -2.62 * -1.21   -2.62 **
R- squared 0.0771   0.0975   0.0816   9.11   0.0861  
F 16.01       9.6   6.46   8.93  
Prob. 0.000       0.000   0.000   0.000  
Wald (X2)     78.11              
Prob. X2     0              
Breusch- Pagan/ Cook- 
Weisberg test  for hetero-
skedasticity 
Ho:  Constant variance
chi2(5) = 113.51, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Woolridge test for autocor-
relation in panel data
Ho: no \rst-order autocorrelation
F(1, 179)= 16.18 Prof > F= 0.0001
F test for \xed e=ect
Ho: ?ere is no heterogeneousness across companies
F(179, 713)= 2.87 Prof>f= 0.000
Breusch and Pagan La-
grange multiplier test for 
random e=ects
Test: var(u) = 0
chi2(1) = 111.83, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman test
Ho: Di=erence in  coeXcients not systematic
chi2(5) = 23.91, Prob > chi2 = 0.0012
Test for time \xed e=ect
Ho: All year coeXcients are jointly equal to zero
F (4, 711) = 1.1 Prof >F= 0.4234
Pesaran CD test
Ho: Errors are not correlated across entities
Pr= 0.9336
Notes: † *p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.1
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Heaney, 2007; La Porta et al., 1999; Le & Buck, 2009). ?is study examines the in<u-
ence of the largest shareholder on dividend policy, an important \nancing decision that 
can a=ect shareholders’ wealth and protect them against misconducts by management. 
Results support the \rst hypothesis that the more shareholdings held by the largest 
shareholder, regardless of their identity, the lower the dividend payout ratio. In general, 
this can be explained by the fact that in the particular corporate governance context of 
Vietnam, where information asymmetry is one of the most striking problems, minority 
shareholders may not be promptly and suXciently provided with information on \rm 
performance. As a consequence, they may be appropriated by the large shareholders 
since minority shareholders may have failed to ask for a higher dividend payment. ?is 
would reveal a common practice in emerging markets (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) that 
the higher the shareholding of the largest shareholders, the more opportunities and 
incentives for this type of shareholders to expropriate others, the lower is the company 
payout. Speci\cally, the largest shareholders are more likely to grasp the bene\ts sup-
posed to be shared by other shareholders. Other shareholders are not protected if earn-
ings are used in manners that are not bene\cial to all shareholders.
?e second hypothesis incorporates the identities of the largest shareholders to de-
termine whether they have any e=ect on dividend payouts. ?e signi\cant coeXcients 
of variables indicate that companies with di=erent identities of their largest sharehold-
ers do not pay similar levels of cash dividends, suggesting that some types of the larg-
est shareholder with di=erent characteristics in terms of motivations, risk aUitudes and 
capabilities may have more or less incentive to force managers to pay dividends. 
In particular, the positive and signi\cant coeXcient of the State variable reveals that 
privatized companies with the State as the largest shareholder will pay higher dividend 
than a base company (company with the largest shareholders as local investors). In the 
speci\c context of Vietnam, one possible explanation is that the government has elimi-
nated many tax barriers a^er becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in 
2005. As a result, that might lead to the decline of the tax revenues for the government. 
?us, the State may have incentive to demand for high payouts to make up for the de-
crease of tax revenues. Companies having the State as the largest shareholder may not 
have to rely much on internal resources for investment purposes because as the largest 
shareholder and the regulator, the State can either implicitly or explicitly back up com-
panies to borrow at favorable loan terms (Ngoc & Mohnen, 2005; Truong & Heaney, 
2007). As a consequence, they may not be constrained to pay out. In addition, the com-
panies may also choose to pay high dividend to aUract other shareholders in order to 
accelerate equitization in Vietnam. In contrast, unlike the State shareholder, local inves-
tors cannot be assured of accessing other sources of \nancing when their companies 
need. ?ey therefore wish to retain funds within the companies for investment pur-
poses, especially in the other companies they own or invest. In other words, they may 
not be willing to pay out as high as companies with the State as the largest shareholders. 
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However, if the State as the largest shareholder abuses their power to in<uence manage-
ment, other shareholders, especially strategic investors who can improve operational 
eXciency may be reluctant to participate in the management of companies. Future re-
search can further investigate this implication. 
With regard to \rms with the largest shareholders as foreign investors, it was found 
that, on average, the \rms pay higher cash dividend payout than a base company. ?is 
can be explained by the fact that because of disadvantages in terms of geographic dis-
tance, and higher information uncertainty compared to the managers, foreign investors 
as \rms’ largest shareholders may require higher cash payouts to monitor the manage-
ment (Cook & Jeon, 2006; Baba, 2009; Warrad et al., 2012; ?anatawee, 2013). ?is 
practice implies that foreign investors may embrace a risk-averse aUitude towards the 
weak corporate governance in Vietnam.
Holding other variables constant, companies with the manager as the largest share-
holder pay lower ratio than a base company, while the coeXcient is not strongly sig-
ni\cant. However, compared to those with the State or foreign investors as the largest 
shareholders, companies with the largest shareholders in management pursue lower 
level of cash dividend. As the manager, the largest shareholder may have more infor-
mation about investment opportunities and business issues than the State and foreign 
investors. ?erefore, they may prefer to retain higher portion of earnings to exploit the 
resources at their convenience. Meanwhile, companies with the largest shareholder in 
management board do not pay lower level of payout than companies with local inves-
tor as the largest shareholder. One possible explanation is that the largest sharehold-
ers who hold management position may share some advantages with local investors 
in understanding the legal instability and investment opportunities of the local mar-
ket. ?erefore, the largest shareholders are not signi\cantly di=erent from local largest 
shareholders. Most importantly, they are more constrained than local largest sharehold-
ers in accessing external debts. ?us, they may desire to pay lower dividend so that they 
can tunnel the resources into the other companies. 
?e relationship between growth opportunities or pro\tability and dividend payout 
ratio is signi\cantly positive. ?is result is opposed to the Pecking order theory (Roze=, 
1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; Jensen et al., 1992) and signaling theory. Given weak corpo-
rate governance context with severe asymmetric information, shareholders may desire 
to be protected by high dividend payouts and consider dividend as an important indica-
tor to evaluate companies for investment decisions. With a strong incentive to maintain 
reputation and aUract potential investors, companies remain paying high dividend and 
rely on external sources for growth opportunities (Harada & Nguyen, 2011). It is true 
that shareholders may gain bene\t from high dividend. However, this may turn out to 
be a problem for the future prospect of companies. Speci\cally, companies may have 
to depend on debt to \nance investment opportunities. ?erefore, internal sources for 
future prospects may be employed to pay current dividend. ?ese practices are consid-
ered unfavorable to shareholder’s wealth in the long run (Harada & Nguyen, 2011).
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In general, the results do provide quantitative evidence on the impact of the largest 
shareholder on dividend policy. ?e negative relationship between shareholdings of the 
largest shareholders and dividend payout ratio may reveal the probability of expropriat-
ing behaviors of large shareholders. From the economic viewpoint, it will be detrimental 
to company if available dollar for investing activities is allocated to low return investment 
facilitated by the expropriating behaviors of the largest shareholder. ?e \ndings of the 
study also reveal di=erences in average levels of dividend payout observed from di=erent 
types of the largest shareholders. Among them, companies with the State or foreign in-
vestor being the largest shareholder may pursue a higher level of payout than companies 
with local investors or managers as the largest shareholders. ?is implies that certain 
types of the largest shareholders may have more preference towards high earnings re-
tention when employed in manners that do not bene\t others. Moreover, while some 
largest shareholders may prefer higher dividend than others, it does not mean that share-
holders may be bene\ted. It may indicate that the largest shareholders serve their own 
purposes, as in the case of the State as the largest shareholder. Or, the largest sharehold-
ers may concern the uncertainty of the company and hence require higher dividend as in 
the case of the foreign investor as the largest shareholder. In addition, dividends may be 
employed to aUract investors at the risk of indebtedness as suggested by the relationship 
between the pro\tability/ growth opportunities and dividend payout ratio. 
?is study has its own limitations. Firstly, the study has drawn conclusions based on 
the reliability of data resource and data suppliers. However, using secondary data has 
limitations under severe transparency problem in Vietnam. Secondly, some variables 
such as free cash <ow, company’s risk and age may be controlled for to provide with 
more profound understanding of dividend behavior of companies. ?e generalization 
of the results will be more compelling if the institutional elements of the researched 
countries are taken into consideration. ?irdly, the complex cross-shareholdings may 
con\ne the ability of the study to understand precise in<uences of each type of the larg-
est shareholders. In addition, the study may not precisely reveal the exact expropriating 
behaviors of the largest shareholders.  ?is question is open to future investigation. ?e 
paper may be considered as an initial aUempt to open an interesting discussion on how 
di=erent types of ownership in<uence dividend paying behavior of companies. 
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